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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
more significantly than is at first apparent. Further litigation may supply
a rationale for prohibiting unions from using forced contributions for
certain purposes. For example, a distinction could be based on the extent
of the abridgement of the individual rights.53 However, a basic rethink-
ing of the judgment espoused in Abood (and attributed to Hanson and
Street) would be a preferable resolution. Such a reexamination would
require, of course, an articulation of state interests that might justify the
first amendment impact of union shops.
Paul S, Hughes
HEARSAY AND THE CONFRONTATION GUARANTY
During defendant's trial for aggravated rape, hearsay evidence was
adniitted pertaining to a medical examination of the alleged victim by an
assistant coroner who was not called as a witness.' The Louisiana Su-
preme Court reversed 2 and held that admission of a business record as
an exception to the hearsay rule is contingent upon proof of the entrant's
unavailability. The court noted that introduction of the evidence without
such proof probably violates the state3 and federal4 constitutional guar-
Douglas, JJ., dissenting). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 236; Note, 75
HARV. L. REV. 233 (1961).
53. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 59 (1976). It is arguable that the impact on
-employees of the use of their compelled contributions for a particular purpose may not be
substantial or significant enough to warrant judicial relief. This line of thought is concep-
tually different from an inquiry into whether there is any impact brought about by those
uses.
1. The trial court admitted the evidence under LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 105 which
states: "A coroner's report and a proces verbal of an autopsy shall be competent evidence
of death and the cause thereof, but not of any other fact."
2. The Louisiana Supreme Court found Code of Criminal Procedure article 105 inap-
plicable because the evidence was not used as evidence of death or the cause thereof, but of
the presence of sperm in the alleged victim's vagina.
The state also argued that the coroner's report should be admissible under the excep-
tion for hospital records, LA. R.S. 13:3714 (Supp. 1966), but the supreme court found this
statute inapplicable because there was no evidence introduced to prove the examination
was conducted in a hospital.
3. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16 provides in part: "An accused is entitled to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to present
a defense, and to testify in his own behalf." See also La. Const. art. I, § 9 (1921).
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anties of the right to confrontation. State v. Monroe, 345 So. 2d 1185 (La.
1977).
The relationship between hearsay and the confrontation clause is
unclear at present. Until recent years, the confrontation clause and hear-
say exceptions existed in harmony. However, United States Supreme
Court decisions in the past thirteen years regarding the scope of protec-
tion afforded criminal defendants by the confrontation guaranty have
questioned the constitutionality of the traditionally recognized hearsay
exceptions.5
The origin and early history of the two concepts seem to indicate
that the confrontation clause was intended to be compatible with the
hearsay exceptions. 6 The hearsay exclusionary rule and its exceptions de-
veloped in the common law. Initially common law juries made informal
investigations among those individuals with knowledge of the incident in
question in order to gather sufficient evidence for a decision. By the late
fifteenth century, jurors were stripped of their investigative duties and
the practice of confining jurors to the courtroom became the predomi-
nant method for conducting trials. With the jurors confined, the need to
ensure the reliability of the evidence presented became evident. To guar-
antee a high degree of reliability, the common law gradually developed
three prerequisites to the introduction of evidence: evidence had to be
presented by a witness who was personally present at trial, under oath,
and subject to cross-examination. 7 Hearsay 8 could not meet these condi-
tions and consequently was not admissible as a general rule. Neverthe-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...."
5. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Cali-
fornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965). See generally Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth
Amendment, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76 (1971).
6. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 252 at 606 (2d ed. 1972); contra, Baker, The Right to
Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposalfor Determining When
Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 532 (1974). Baker correctly
states that research has uncovered little documentation on the purpose of the draftsmen of
the confrontation clause, but he does not consider the circumstances existing at the time the
provision was drafted in 1789. See text at notes 10-15, infra.
7. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 244-45.
8. Hearsay is difficult to define in a brief statement. Definitions include:
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (4th rev. ed. 1968); "HEARSAY. Evidence not proceed-
ing from the personal knowledge of the witness, but from mere repetition of what he has
heard others say."
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 246, at 584: "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court,
or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an
1978]
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less, numerous hearsay exceptions were recognized, and were justified by
the hearsay's unusual reliability and the extreme necessity for certain
types of hearsay.9
The early common law exceptions to the hearsay exclusionary rule
were firmly established when the confrontation guaranty was included in
the Bill of Rights.' 0 Yet the confrontation clause is written as an absolute
guaranty and, if interpreted literally, would exclude the use of all hear-
say.II In 1895, in Mattox v. United States,12 the Supreme Court declared
that the clause's primary objective was to forbid the hated English prac-
tice of using depositions and exparte affidavits in lieu of a personal ex-
amination of the witness. 13 The court then admitted evidence under the
prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule despite confrontation ob-
jections by the accused. 14 The Mattox court's rejection of a literal inter-
pretation of the confrontation clause, so as to admit hearsay evidence in
the face of a confrontation argument, caused some scholars to conclude
that confrontation does not impose restrictions upon the traditional hear-
say exceptions.t 5
These conclusions seemed correct until 1970, when the Court in Cal-
assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." (Footnote omitted).
FED. R. EVID. 801(c): "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by a declarant
while testifying, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
For a more comprehensive definition see Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and
Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 768 (1961).
9. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 245; Seidelson, supra note 5 at 89.
10. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 252; see Note, Preserving the Right to Confronta-
tion-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 746
(1965) [hereinafter cited as A New Approach to HearsaA.
11. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 252, at 606; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 800[04] [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. The text of the confrontation
clause is in note 4, supra.
12. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
13. Id. at 242.
14. Id. at 244.
15. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 252. Among the recent scholars who adhere to
this view are Justice Harlan and Professor Wigmore. See notes 32-34, infra, and accompa-
nying text.
When Mattox was first appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court stated, "Dying dec-
larations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of the homicide and the person
by whom it was committed, in favor of the defendant as well as against him." Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). This statement also encouraged scholars to con-
clude hearsay and the confrontation clause were congruent concepts, but it must be noted
that the last five words of this statement comprised a dictum, because the dying declaration
in question was offered on behalf of the accused, not against him, and therefore no con-
frontation problem existed. See Seidelson, supra note 5, at 89.
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ifornia v. Green16 expressly rejected the notion that the confrontation
clause excludes only evidence which would be excluded by the hearsay
rule. 17 The clause, which had been rarely invoked in the past, became
the court's principal vehicle for imposing constitutional restrictions upon
the introduction of hearsay evidence. 18 Although the court has failed to
define clearly the extent of these restrictions, 19 some general principle
may be gleaned from the decisions. The confrontation guaranty is satis-
fied when the declarant is present at trial and subject to full cross-exami-
nation. 20 Actual unavailability of the declarant will also usually result in
the admissibility of the hearsay if it qualifies under a traditional excep-
tion, despite the demands of the confrontation clause. 2 1 A question re-
mains whether the Supreme Court will require a showing of
unavailability to admit evidence under a hearsay exception for which
unavailability is considered immaterial.
22
Modem evidence codes23 divide hearsay into two major categories.
One consists of those exceptions under which evidence can be admitted
only if the declarant is unavailable. In these exceptions, such as prior
testimony and statements against interest, the declarant's testimony in
court is believed to be more reliable than the recorded evidence. 24 How-
ever, if the declarant is truly unavailable, the evidence may be admitted
16. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
17. Id. at 155: "While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confron-
tation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or
less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions."
Several important earlier decisions suggested the conclusion ultimately reached by the
Court in Green. Perhaps the most important of these was Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965), in which the Court held the confrontation clause applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For discussion of the impact of
Pointer and other pre- Green cases, see Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee
and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651 (1970); Comment, Federal Confrontatiotr. A Not
Very Clear Say on Hearsay, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 366 (1966).
18. See cases cited in note 5, supra.
19. See text at notes 20-36, infra. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, 800[04].
20. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
21. Justice Harlan made a persuasive analysis in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring): "[Tihe Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
reaches no further than to require the prosecution to produce an available witness whose
declaration it seeks to use in a criminal trial." See generally Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
22. See text at notes 23-37, in/ra: WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, 800[04].
23. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 (1975); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 803, 804
(1974).
24. FED. R. EVID. 804 (1975); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 804 (1974). See generaly
Hearsay Evidence and the FederalRules. Article VIII, 36 LA. L. REV. 159 (1975), in Sympo-
1978]
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out of necessity.25 The second category consists of those exceptions, such
as present sense impressions, excited utterances, and business records, for
which the presence of the declarant in court is considered to be immate-
rial. The declarant's testimony is not considered to be more reliable than
the recorded evidence under these exceptions because the evidence is
produced under conditions which guarantee a very high degree of relia-
bility.26
In Dutton v. Evans,27 the Supreme Court considered whether evi-
dence was admissible under a Georgia statute which allowed co-conspir-
ators to testify regarding statements made by fellow co-conspirators. The
Court looked to three factors-the reliability of the evidence, the signifi-
cance of the evidence in the case, and the conduct of the prosecu-
tor-and held that the evidence was admissible without a showing of
unavailability. 28 However, Dutton raised more questions than it an-
swered. The Court did not indicate the relative weight to be given to
each factor, nor did it indicate the standards for determining whether
evidence is unreliable or insignificant, or whether a prosecutor has been
guilty of misconduct. 29 In a subsequent case, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 30 the
Court failed to clarify the significance of the three factors considered in
Dutton. 31
At present, the Supreme Court may be in the process of abandoning
the confrontation clause as a means for imposing constitutional restric-
tions upon the use of hearsay. In a concurring opinion in Dutton,32 Jus-
tice Harlan indicated that the confrontation clause may be too restrictive
and imprecise for such a purpose. He suggested that the Court adopt
Wigmore's idea that the law of evidence determines when a witness must
be produced and that the confrontation clause prescribes the mode of
sium, The Federal Rules ofEvidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 59 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Article
VIIA .
25. FED. R. EvID. 804 (1975), Adv. Comm. Note.
26. See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 803 (1974); FED. R. EVID. 803 (1975), Adv.
Comm. Note. See generally Article VIII supra note 24, at 159.
27. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
28. Id at 87-89. See WEINSTEIN, supra note i1, 800[041; The Supreme Caurt-1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 198 (1971).
29. The opinion in Dutton, written by Justice Stewart for a four-man plurality, has
been criticized for its carelessness. See WEINSTEIN, supra note I1, 800[04]; The Supreme
Court-1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 198 (1971).
30. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
31. Id at 213. The Court seemed to consider the reliability factor as most significant,
but did little toward clarifying factors considered in Dutton.
32. 400 U.S. at 93 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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procedure to be followed.3 3 He recommended using the more flexible
concept of due process to impose constitutional restrictions.341n Cham-
bers v. Mississ6Vpi,35 Justice Powell spoke principally in terms of due pro-
cess instead of confrontation, 36 giving some indication that the Supreme
Court may be willing to follow Justice Harlan's suggestion in the future.
However, the confrontation guaranty arose in an unusual context and
along with another due process issue, creating doubt about whether Jus-
tice Powell spoke in terms of due process because of dissatisfaction with
the confrontation clause.37For the present, it is unclear whether confron-
tation requries a showing of unavailability when such a showing is con-
sidered immaterial under the law of evidence.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has followed the United States
Supreme Court's expansion of the confrontation clause, and has ex-
33. Id. at 94. Justice Harlan quoted the following statement from Wigmore: "The
Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying declarations,
or the like) shall be given infra-judicially,--this depends on the law of Evidence for the
time being,-but only what mode of procedure shall be followed- i.e. a cross-examining
procedure-in the case of such testimony as is required by the ordinary law of Evidence to
be given infra-judicially. 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 1940)."
It should be noted that Harlan attacked Wigmore's view in his opinion in Green, stat-
ing that such a view "would have the practical consequence of rendering meaningless what
was assuredly in some sense meant to be an enduring guarantee." 399 U.S. at 178. Some
feel Harlan never satisfactorily explained his full circle swing to Wigmore in Dutton. See
Baker, supra note 6, at 534.
34. 400 U.S. at 100. The view advocated by Harlan in Dutton is questioned by many.
Baker, supra note 6, at 534; A New Approach to Hearsay, supra note 10, at 742; Comment,
Hearsay and Confrontation: Can the Criminal Defendant's Rights Be Preserved Under Bifur-
cated Standard?, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 243, 272 (1975). The principal argument against
use of due process alone to impose constitutional restrictions upon the use of hearsay is that
it places too much reliance upon each judge's subjective perception of the evidence.
35. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
36. Id. at 295-303.
37. Id Chambers claimed a denial of due process because of the combined effect of
two factors. Chambers had called as a witness one McDonald, who had earlier confessed to
the crime of which Chambers was accused. Chambers introduced into evidence McDon-
ald's sworn out-of-court confession. On cross-examination by the state, McDonald stated
that he had later repudiated his confession. Chambers was prevented from pursuing the
matter further because the Mississippi court applied the voucher rule, a common law rule
based on the premise that a party vouches for the credibility of his witness and therefore
cannot later impeach his testimony. The Supreme Court held that Chambers was denied
the right to confront and cross-examine his own witness.
Additionally, the Mississippi court ruled that other confessions made by McDonald to
three witnesses were inadmissible under the hearsay exception for declarations against in-
terest because the confessions were not against the pecuniary interests of the declarant. The
Supreme Court indicated that the declarations were very reliable under the circumstances
and should be admitted into evidence.
19781
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panded the confrontation guarantee of the state constitution accord-
ingly.38 As a result, the state and federal confrontation clauses have been
construed interchangeably, despite the fact that the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1974 guarantees the criminal defendant a right to cross-examina-
tion in addition to confrontation, 39 making the state guaranty appear to
be broader. The United States Supreme Court and the Louisiana
Supreme Court have both recognized that confrontation necessarily in-
cludes the right to cross-examination. 40
Originally, as the business records exception developed in the com-
mon law, proof of unavailability of the entrant was required. With the
advent of the modem business era, this requirement became too restric-
tive. In modern businesses the difficulty and often impossibility of iden-
tifying and producing the persons who handled the various steps of
transactions, coupled with the probability that such persons cannot recall
the transactions, makes the requirement impractical. The courts were
first to recognize this impracticality by allowing unavailability to be
proven by a showing of mercantile inconvenience. 41 Recent statutes rec-
ognize that business records are reliable because of the circumstances
under which they are recorded 42 and have made proof of unavailability
immaterial. They require only that the method of record-keeping be ex-
plained by a custodian or other qualified witness. 43
38. Eg., State v. Bell, 346 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1977); State v. Jones, 325 So. 2d 235 (La.
1976); State v. Sam, 283 So. 2d 81 (La. 1973); State v. Washington, 261 La. 808, 261 So. 2d
224 (1972). The decisions in Sam and Washington came before, and the decisions in Bell
and Jones after, the enactment of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. In all four cases the
Louisiana Supreme Court relied totally upon federal cases decided under the sixth amend-
ment and earlier Louisiana cases based upon federal cases, indicating that the guaranty of
confrontation in the Louisiana Constitution is identical to its counterpart in the United
States Constitution.
39. See note 3, supra.
40. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
stated; "The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity
to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness ....
This statement is quoted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State Y. Sam, 283 So. 2d 81,
84 (La. 1973).
41. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §§ 305-11; see generally Green, The Modeland
Uniform Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 49, 55 (1962).
42. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (1975), Adv. Comm. Note.
43. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (1975) and UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(6) (1974) both
provide with regard to business records:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
[Vol. 38
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Before State v. Monroe, the Louisiana Supreme Court had not
clearly indicated whether the common law or modern requirements re-
garding business records were applicable.44 This was partially due to the
fact that the exception has only recently come into general use in crimi-
nal cases in Louisiana. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 did not
specifically provide for a business records exception; article 434, which
excludes all hearsay "except as otherwise provided in this Code, '45 was
thought to preclude use of the exception.46 In 1973 the Supreme Court
held in State v. Smith47 that the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure was
adopted in the contemplation that traditional hearsay exceptions would
remain in force.48 However, in subsequent cases the court applied either
the common law or modem requirements for admission of business
records in a haphazard fashion.49
In the instant case, the court held that unavailability must be shown
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness, [shall be admissible] unless the source of in-
formation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit.
44. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 671 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 547 (1975). The relevant cases are cited in note
49, infra
45. LA. R.S. 15:434 (1950). When the present Code of Criminal Procedure was
adopted in Louisiana in 1966, the evidentiary provisions of the 1928 Code were shifted to
title 15 of the Revised Statutes.
46. See note 48, infra.
47. 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
48. "From the prior statutes, jurisprudence, and the structure of the 1928 Code itself, it
is evident that the hearsay exclusionary rule was adopted with the contemplation that its
traditional exceptions would reman [sic] in force." 285 So. 2d at 244. See The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 543 (1975).
49. In State v. Junegain, 324 So. 2d 438 (La. 1975), the court applied the common law
requirement of unavailability. The court noted that an investigative report was not admissi-
ble because the entrant of the record was not unavailable to testify. In State v. Launey, 335
So. 2d 435 (La. 1976), the court also applied the common law requirement but admitted
evidence under the exception upon a showing of mercantile inconvenience. The court
stated, "considering the distance and expense involved in requiring that person to appear at
the trial, it can be considered that he was, for all practical purposes, unavailable."
In several other cases the court apparently adhered to the modem view. In State v.
Graves, 259 La. 526, 250 So. 2d 727 (1971), State v. Lewis, 288 So. 2d 348 (La. 1974), State
v. Corey, 339 So. 2d 804 (La. 1976), and State v. Roche, 341 So. 2d 348 (La. 1977), the court
admitted a firearms record, an inventory sheet, phone slips, and gambling records of a
casino respectively. In each instance the evidence was admitted without proof of unavaila-
bility. In State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421 (La. 1975), the court expressly followed the
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as a prerequisite to the introduction of business records,50 stating that it
had always intended to follow the common law requisite of proof of un-
availability, but had mistakenly admitted business records in several
cases without such proof.5 1 However, at common law it was sufficient to
show that the appearance of the entrant of the record would be an incon-
venience. 52 The court rejected this aspect of the common law exception
and stated that the right to confrontation in criminal cases is "para-
mount."
5 3
Although the court did not expressly state that proof of unavailabil-
ity will be required under all hearsay exceptions for which such proof
has been thought immaterial, the holding in Monroe does raise the ques-
tion whether in future cases the court will find the confrontation clause
to be "paramount" in every hearsay category. It is not even clear whether
Monroe will apply to all business records. The requirement that unavail-
ability be shown was reasonable as applied to a coroner's report, but
several factors militate against the imposition of this requirement upon a
typical business record. Business records are reliable because they are
recorded in the daily course of business by a trained entrant, checked by
systematic balance-striking, and relied upon as the basis for future busi-
ness activity.5 4 This reliability, combined with the probability that the
entrant, if he can be identified, will not recall the transaction among the
hundred he has handled, makes the requirement of proof of unavailabil-
ity impractical. 5" A coroner's report is not made subject to these condi-
tions which insure reliability. A coroner must make subjective
conclusions which only he can best explain. Additionally, the examining
modem form of the exception, holding that proof of unavailability is unnecessary when
computer print-out sheets are admitted as business records.
50. 345 So. 2d at 1190.
51. Id. at 1188. Regarding the cases in which a showing of unavailability was not
required, the court overruled Corey and Graves insofar as they did not require a showing
of unavailability. The remaining cases, Launey, Junegain, Roche, and Hodgeson were not
overruled because in each case it was apparent from the facts that the entrant of the record
probably could not have been identified and was thus unavailable.
52. See id. at 1189. See also text at note 41, supra, regarding mercantile inconvenience.
The assistant coroner in the instant case did not appear at the trial because he had been
called to deliver a baby.
53. 345 So. 2d at 1189.
54. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 306, at 720.
55. Note that the defendant is not left defenseless when proof of unavailability is not
required. Several other factors must be considered by the court before the record may be
admitted into evidence. If the judge does not believe that the source of the information or
the circumstances of preparation indicate sufficient trustworthiness, he may deny use of the
exception. The court in Monroe could have simply held the coroner's report to be untrust-
worthy because it did not carry the indicia of reliability of a normal business record.
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coroner is identifiable and he is likely to remember the specific examina-
tion.
The underlying rationale of Monroe suggests that unavailability
must be proven under other exceptions in which unavailability has been
deemed to be immaterial. Proof of unavailability would then be a pre-
requisite to the introduction of excited utterances and present sense im-
pressions.5 6 Once again, the result of such an approach would be to
impose needless impediments to the introduction of evidence by the
state. In neither instance would the presence of the witness enhance the
reliability of the evidence, because the circumstances under which the
evidence is produced tend to ensure reliability.5 7
The underlying rationale of Monroe also suggests that the confron-
tation clause may be "paramount" despite the presence of Louisiana
statutes which specifically authorize the introduction of certain types of
hearsay without proof of unavailability. One such statute is Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 105, which allows a coroner's report or
proces verbal of an autopsy to be introduced as evidence of death and
the cause thereof.5 8 A much broader example may arise in the future
should the Louisiana legislature adopt a hearsay rule similar to that of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules do not require proof
of unavailability when present sense impressions, excited utterances,
then existing mental, emotional or physical conditions, or records of reg-
ularly conducted activity are produced as evidence.59 In a decision under
such statutes, the court could not turn to jurisprudential rules as it did in
56. These are two of the major exceptions in which proof of unavailability is consid-
ered to be immaterial. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (1975).
57. Underlying the present sense impression exception "is the assumption that state-
ments of perception substantially contemporaneous with an event are highly trustworthy
because: (1) the statement being simultaneous with the event, there is no memory problem;
(2) there is little or no time for calculated misstatement; and (3) the statement is usually
made to one who has equal opportunity to observe and check misstatements." WEINSTEIN,
supra note 11, 803(1) [01]. Excited utterances are trustworthy for similar reasons. See id.
803(2) [01].
58. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 105 states: "A coroner's report and a proces verbal of an
autopsy shall be competent evidence of death and the cause thereof but not of any other
fact." In State v. Holmes, 258 La. 221, 224, 245 So. 2d 707, 710 (1971) the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the right of confrontation was not violated when a coroner's re-
port made without a proces verbal was offered in evidence. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 406 U.S. 909 (1972). The defendant was later released, however, in
a habeas corpus proceeding. United States District Court, Western Division, Civil Action
72-178 (United States District Court, W.D. La.).
59. FED. R. EVID. 803 (1975).
1978]
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Monroe, and would be forced to decide whether the confrontation clause
imposes a constitutional bar to otherwise admissible evidence.
It is submitted that the Louisiana Supreme Court should not require
proof of unavailability in situations in which the requirement will not
augment the reliability of the evidence. Although the United States
Supreme Court has left the area of unavailability in a state of confusion,
the Court has not required that unavailability be shown in instances in
which such a showing is considered immaterial. By adopting the con-
frontation clause as its tool for applying these restrictions, the Louisiana
Supreme Court cannot hope to find the clause any less confining and
unwieldy than the United States Supreme Court has found it.60 Should
the United States Supreme Court abandon use of the confrontation
clause, the Louisiana Supreme Court will be deprived of an important
source of guidance in an area already fraught with confusion. The Loui-
siana Supreme Court can avoid these undesirable results by limiting the
application of Monroe to coroner's reports.
Gordon L. James
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR RAPE-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT?
Defendant raped a woman and stabbed her to death. Eight months
later he kidnapped another woman, raped her twice, and abandoned her
to die after severely beating her. While serving multiple life terms for
these offenses he escaped and kidnapped, raped, and robbed a third wo-
man at knifepoint. He was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death.
The United States Supreme Court heldthat the death penalty is a grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the rape of an adult wo-
man and therefore violates the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
Throughout its history the Supreme Court has dealt with many
cases involving the death penalty, but only quite recently has it directly
addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty per se. In the nine-
teenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the Court's scrutiny was lim-
ited to determining whether execution methods were "torturous" or
60. See text at notes 22-37, supra.
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